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Abstract  
Social influence is the process by which individuals adapt their opinion, revise their beliefs, or 
change their behavior as a result of social interactions with other people. In our strongly 
interconnected society, social influence plays a prominent role in many self-organized 
phenomena such as herding in cultural markets, the spread of ideas and innovations, and the 
amplification of fears during epidemics. Yet, the mechanisms of opinion formation remain poorly 
understood, and existing physics-based models lack systematic empirical validation. Here, we 
report two controlled experiments showing how participants answering factual questions revise 
their initial judgments after being exposed to the opinion and confidence level of others. Based 
on the observation of 59 experimental subjects exposed to peer-opinion for 15 different items, we 
draw an influence map that describes the strength of peer influence during interactions. A simple 
process model derived from our observations demonstrates how opinions in a group of 
interacting people can converge or split over repeated interactions. In particular, we identify two 
major attractors of opinion: (i) the expert effect, induced by the presence of a highly confident 
individual in the group, and (ii) the majority effect, caused by the presence of a critical mass of 
laypeople sharing similar opinions. Additional simulations reveal the existence of a tipping point 
at which one attractor will dominate over the other, driving collective opinion in a given 
direction. These findings have implications for understanding the mechanisms of public opinion 
formation and managing conflicting situations in which self-confident and better informed 
minorities challenge the views of a large uninformed majority. 
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Introduction 
In many social and biological systems, individuals rely on the observation of others to adapt their 
behaviors, revise their judgments, or make decisions [1–4]. In human populations, the access to 
social information has been greatly facilitated by the ongoing growth of communication 
technology. In fact, people are constantly exposed to a steady flow of opinions, advice and 
judgments of others about political ideas, new technologies, or commercial products [5]. When 
facing the opinions of peers on a given issue, people tend to filter and integrate the social 
information they receive and adjust their own beliefs accordingly [6,7]. At the scale of a group, 
repeated local influences among group members may give rise to complex patterns of opinion 
dynamics such as consensus formation, polarization, or fragmentation [8–11]. For example, it has 
been shown that people sharing similar extreme opinions, such as racial prejudices, tend to 
strengthen their judgment and confidence after interacting with one another [12]. Similar 
mechanisms of opinion dynamics can take place in a variety of social contexts, such as within a 
group of friends exchanging opinions about their willingness to get vaccinated against influenza 
[13,14]. At even larger scales, local influences among friends, family members, or coworkers — 
often combined with the global effects of mass media — constitute a major mechanism driving 
opinion formation during elections, shaping cultural markets [15], producing amplification or 
attenuation of risk perceptions [16,17], and shaping public opinion about social issues, such as 
atomic energy or climate change [18].  
Given the remarkably large scope of social phenomena that are shaped by social influence and 
opinion dynamics, it is surprising that the behavioral mechanisms underlying these processes 
remain poorly understood. Important issues remain open: How do people adjust their judgment 
during social interactions?  What are the underlying heuristics of opinion adaptation? And how 
do these local influences eventually generate global patterns of opinion change? Much of the 
existing modeling work about opinion dynamics has been addressed from a physics-based point 
of view, where the basic mechanisms of social influence are derived from analogies with physical 
systems, in particular with spin systems [19–23]. The wide variety of existing models assumes 
that individuals hold binary or continuous opinion values (usually lying between -1 and 1), which 
are updated over repeated interactions among neighboring agents. Different models assume 
different rules of opinion adaptation, such as imitation [24], averaging over people with similar 
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opinions [25,26], following the majority [27], or more sophisticated equations [8,22]. Although 
informative as to the complex dynamics that can possibly emerge in a collective context, these 
simulation-based contributions share a common drawback: the absence of empirical verification 
of the models’ assumptions [28]. Indeed, it is difficult to track and measure how opinions change 
under experimental conditions, as these changes depend on many social and psychological factors 
such as the personality of the individuals, their confidence level, their credibility, their social 
status, or their persuasive power [18]. In other disciplines such as psychology and cognitive 
science, laboratory experiments have been conducted to study how people integrate feedback 
from other individuals to revise their initial answers to factual questions [6,29,30]. However, the 
findings of local rules of opinion adaptation have not yet been used to study the collective 
dynamics of the system, and it remains unclear how social influence plays out in larger scale 
social contexts over time [31]. 
The present work draws upon experimental methods inspired by social psychology and 
theoretical concepts of complex systems typical of statistical physics. First, we conducted 
controlled experiments to describe the micro-level mechanisms of social influence, that is, how 
individuals revise their initial beliefs after being exposed to the opinion of another person. Then, 
we elaborated an individual-based model of social influence, which served to investigate the 
collective dynamics of the system. In a first experiment (see Materials & Methods), 52 
participants were instructed to answer a series of 32 general knowledge questions and evaluate 
their confidence level on a scale ranging from 1 (very unsure) to 6 (very sure). This baseline 
experiment was used to characterize the initial configuration of the system before any social 
influence occurs. In a second experimental session, 59 participants answered 15 questions in the 
same way but were then exposed to the estimate and confidence level of another participant 
(henceforth referred to as “feedback”) and asked to revise their initial answer. This procedure 
renders opinion changes traceable, and the effects of social influence measureable at the 
individual level. Moreover, changes in confidence were tracked as well, by asking participants to 
evaluate their confidence level before and after social influence. Despite empirical evidence 
suggesting that changes of opinion and confidence are intimately related [29], and theoretical 
work emphasizing the important role of inflexible, highly confident agents [32,33], this aspect of 
social influence remains poorly understood. Following the methods of existing experiments, we 
deliberately asked neutral, general knowledge questions, which allows capturing the mechanisms 
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of opinion adaptation while controlling its emotional impact [6,30]. By exploring a simple model 
derived from our observations, we demonstrate that the collective dynamics of opinion formation 
in large groups of people are driven by two major “attractors of opinion”: (i) the presence of a 
highly confident individual and (ii) the presence of clusters of low-confidence individuals sharing 
a similar opinion. In particular, we show that a critical amount of approximately 15% of experts 
is necessary to counteract the attractive effect of a large majority of lay individuals. As people are 
embedded in strongly connected social networks and permanently influence one another, these 
results constitute a first step toward a better understanding of the mechanisms of propagation, 
reinforcement, or polarization of ideas and attitudes in modern societies. 
Results 
Experimental results. We first use the data from the first experiment to characterize the initial 
configuration of the system before any social influence occurs, that is, how opinions are initially 
distributed and how the accuracy and confidence of the answers are correlated with each other. 
As shown in the example in Fig. 1A, the initial distribution of opinions has a lognormal shape, 
with a typical long tail indicating the significant presence of outliers. For each of 32 items we 
performed a Kolmogorov-Smirnov normality test of log(Oi), where Oi  is the initial opinion of 
individual i. The test yielded p-values above .05 for 84% of the items, indicating that the null 
hypothesis cannot be rejected at the 5% significance level for these items. The remaining 16% 
still had reasonably high p-values (always >10-3), suggesting that the initial opinions Oi indeed 
follow a lognormal distribution.  
We also analyzed the correlation between the confidence level of the participants and the 
accuracy of their answer (Fig. 1B). Interestingly, the confidence level is not such a reliable cue 
for accuracy [34]. First, we found no significant correlation between an individual i’s confidence 
level Ci and the quality of his or her answer (a correlation test between Ci and the error 
Err(Oi ) = 1−
Oi
T  where T is the true value yielded a coefficient of –.03). Nevertheless, a trend 
can be highlighted by grouping the data into classes of error ranges: very good answers 
(Err(Oi ) ≤ 0.1 ), good answers ( 0.1< Err(Oi ) ≤ 0.3), bad answers ( 0.3< Err(Oi ) ≤1) and very 
bad answers (Err(Oi )>1). As it can be seen from Fig. 1B, only the maximum confidence level 
Ci=6 is a relevant indicator of the quality of the answer, leading to a good or very good estimate 
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in 80% of the time. By contrast, lower confidence levels are less informative about accuracy. For 
instance, the second highest confidence value of Ci=5 has a 39% chance to correspond to a bad or 
very bad estimate. Similarly, a value of Ci=4 is more likely to accompany a bad or very bad 
estimate (53%) than a good or very good one (47%). The lowest confidence values Ci=1 and Ci=2 
do not differ from each other. Taking the revised estimates of Experiment 2 into account, we 
observe that the reliability of high confidence judgments is undermined by social influence [29]. 
As shown in Fig. 2B, the distribution of errors for very confident individuals (Ci=5 or 6) becomes 
more noisy, widespread and clustered around certain values thus becoming less informative about 
accuracy after social influence.  
To explore the wisdom of crowds, we compared the accuracy of various aggregating methods 
before and after social influence occurred (Fig. 2A). Our results agree with previous findings 
[29,35]. We find that the error distributions tend to become widespread, now covering a greater 
proportion of also high error values after social influence, regardless of the aggregating method.  
Next, we focus on how people adjust their opinion after being informed about the opinion of 
another individual, which is the aim of Experiment 2. In agreement with previous studies [6,30], 
our results show that two variables have an important influence on how the individual i revises 
his or her opinion when exposed to the opinion and confidence of another participant j: the 
difference in confidence values ΔCij =Ci −Cj  and the normalized distance between opinions: 
ΔOij = Oj −Oi /Oi , where Oj and Cj represent the opinion and confidence level of participant j, 
respectively [6]. To provide a visual, quantitative overview of the effects of social influence, we 
draw an influence map that illustrates the interplay of these two variables in the process of 
opinion adaptation (Fig. 3). For the sake of simplicity, we distinguish three possible heuristics 
[30]: 
1. Keep initial opinion, when individuals do not change their judgment after receiving a 
feedback, that is: Ri = Oi, where Ri is the revised opinion of participant i. 
2. Make a compromise, when the revised opinion falls in between the initial opinion Oi and the 
feedback Oj: min(Oi, Oj)< Ri <max(Oi, Oj).  
3. Adopt other opinion, when an individual i adopts the partner’s opinion: Ri = Oj. 
The influence map shows the heuristic that is used by the majority of people as ΔCij and ΔOij  
change (Fig. 3A). Most of the data points (86% of 885) are found for −3≤ ΔCij ≤ 3  and 
 6 
ΔOij ≤1.2 , which cover a large part of the influence map and seem to be reasonable ranges being 
also encountered in real life situations. At the edge of the map, however, the results are more 
uncertain due to the scarcity of available data points. 
Figure 3A shows that the first and more conservative strategy tends to dominate the two others. 
In particular, the majority of people systematically keep their opinion when the value of ΔCij  is 
positive, that is, when their own confidence exceeds their partner’s [30]. However, when their 
confidence level is equal or lower than their partner’s, individuals tend to adapt their opinion 
accordingly. Importantly, one can distinguish three zones in the influence map, according to the 
distance between estimates ΔOij  (Fig. 3B). First, when both individuals have a similar opinion 
(ΔOij <0.3), individuals tend to keep their initial judgment, irrespective of their partner’s 
confidence. Moreover, they also have a strong tendency to increase their confidence level (see 
Fig. 4A indicating the changes in confidence). Therefore, we interpret this area of agreement as 
being a confirmation zone, where feedback tends to simultaneously reinforce initial opinions and 
increase an individual’s confidence.  
It turns out that feedback has the strongest influence at intermediate levels of disagreement, when 
0.3<ΔOij <1.1. In this zone, the “compromise” heuristic is selected by most people when 
−3≤ ΔCij ≤ 0 , and the “adoption” heuristic appears for lower values of ΔCij . We call this the 
influence zone, where social influence is strongest. Here, the other’s opinion differs sufficiently 
from the initial opinion to trigger a revision but is still not far enough away to be completely 
ignored. In particular, the confidence level of the participants tends to remain the same after the 
interaction (Fig. 4B). 
Finally, when the distance between opinions is very large (i.e., ΔOij >1), the strength of social 
influence diminishes progressively [6]. In this zone, people seem to pay little attention to the 
judgment of another, presumably assuming that it may be an erroneous answer. Nevertheless, the 
other’s opinion is not entirely ignored, as the majority of people still choose the “compromise” 
heuristic when the partner is markedly more confident (i.e. ΔCij ≤ 2 ). Moreover, people who are 
initially very confident (i.e. Ci ≥ 5) presumably begin to doubt the accuracy of their judgment 
and exhibit a high likelihood (of almost 70%) of reducing their confidence level. Even more 
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remote opinions are likely to be ignored entirely, but as this situation rarely occurs our data does 
not warrant a reliable conclusion here.  
 
The model. Taking these empirical regularities into account, we now elaborate an individual-
based model of opinion adaptation and explore the collective dynamics of opinion change when 
many people influence each other repeatedly. To this end, we first describe the above influence 
map by means of a simplified diagram showing the heuristics that are used by most individuals 
according to ΔOij  and ΔCij  (Fig. 3B). Alternatively, the same diagram can be characterized as a 
decision tree (Fig. 3C). The model is defined as follows: 
First, an individual notes the distance ΔOij  between his or her own and a partner’s opinion and 
classifies it as near, far, or at an intermediate distance. For this, we used two threshold values of 
τ1 = 0.3  and τ 2 =1.1 , assuming that the feedback is near when ΔOij <τ1 , far when ΔOij >τ 2 , and 
at an intermediate distance otherwise. The numerical values of τ1  and τ 2  were determined 
empirically from the influence map. Second, the individual considers the difference in confidence 
values ΔCij  to choose among the three heuristics. Again, we define two threshold values α1  and 
α2  and assume that the individual decides to “keep own opinion” if ΔCij ≥α1 , to “adopt other 
opinion” if ΔCij ≤α2 , and to “make a compromise” otherwise. The three strategies can be 
formally defined as Ri =Oi +ω(Oj −Oi ) , where the parameter ω  delineates the strength of social 
influence. Therefore, we have ω = 0  when the individual decides to “keep own opinion”, and 
ω =1 when the individual decides to “adopt”. When the individual chooses the “compromise” 
strategy, that is when 0 >ω >1 , the average weight value ω  as measured from our data equals to 
ω = 0.4  (SD=0.24), indicating that people did not move exactly between their initial estimate and 
the feedback (which would correspond to a weight value of 0.5), but exhibited a bias toward their 
own initial opinion [30]. Over all our data points, 53% correspond to the first strategy (ω = 0 ), 
43% to the second (0 >ω >1 ), and 4% to the third (ω =1). 
The values of α1  and α2  depend on the distance zone defined before:  
- When ΔOij  is small, the other’s opinion constitutes a confirmation of the initial opinion. 
According to our observations, α1 =-5 and α2 =-6. Additionally, the confidence level Ci is 
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increased by one point if ΔCij ≤ −4 . As indicated by Fig. 4A, Ci is also increased by one point 
with a probability p=0.5 when −4 ≤ ΔCij ≤ 0 , and remains the same otherwise.  
- When ΔOij  is intermediate, the feedback has a significant influence on the subject’s opinion. 
In this case, we set α1 =0 and α2 =-3. The data shows that the confidence level is changed 
only if ΔCij ≤ −3  (Fig. 4B). In this case, Ci increases with probability p=0.5, and remains the 
same otherwise. 
- When ΔOij  is large, the thresholds are set to α1 =-2 and α2 =-6. This time, the confidence 
level decreases by one point when ΔCij ≥ 4 , and remains the same otherwise. 
Here, all the parameter values were directly extracted from the observations (Fig.3B and Fig.4).  
 
Collective dynamics. Having characterized the effects of social influence at the individual level, 
we now scale up to the collective level and study how repeated influences among many people 
play out at the population scale. Because the macroscopic features of the system are only visible 
when a large number of people interact many times, it would be extremely difficult to investigate 
this under laboratory conditions. Therefore, we conducted a series of numerical simulations of 
the above model to investigate the collective dynamics of the system.  
The initial conditions of our simulations correspond to the exact starting configurations observed 
in our experiments (i.e., the precise opinion and confidence values of all 52 participants observed 
in the first experiment) [36]. In each simulation round, the 52 individuals are randomly grouped 
into pairs, and both individuals in a pair update their opinions according to the opinion of the 
other person, as predicted by our model. Thus, each individual is both a source and the target of 
social influence. We performed N=300 rounds of simulated interactions, where N has been 
chosen large enough to ensure that the system has reached a stationary state. Here, we make the 
assumption that the decision tree that has been extracted from our experiment remains the same 
over repeated interactions. This assumption is reasonable to the extent that the outcome of the 
decision tree (i.e. the strategy that is chosen) depends on the confidence level of the individual, 
which is expected to change as people receive new feedback. In such a way, the strategies that 
will be selected by individuals are connected to the individual history of past interactions. 
Fig. 5 shows the dynamics observed for three representative examples of simulations. Although a 
certain level of opinion fragmentation still remains, a majority of individuals converge toward a 
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similar opinion. As shown by the arrow maps in Fig.5, the first rounds of the simulation exhibit 
important movements of opinions among low-confidence individuals (as indicated by the large 
horizontal arrows for confidence lower than 3), without increase of confidence (as shown in Fig. 
S2). After a certain number of rounds, however, a tipping point occurs at which a critical 
proportion of people meet up in the same region of the opinion space. This creates a subsequent 
increase of confidence in this zone, which in turn becomes even more attractive to others. This 
results in a positive reinforcement loop, leading to a stationary state in which the majority of 
people end up sharing a similar opinion. This amplification process is also marked by a sharp 
transition of the system’s global confidence level (Fig. S2), which is a typical signature of phase 
transitions in complex systems [2].  
An intriguing finding of our simulations is that the collective opinion does not converge toward 
the average value of initial opinions (a correlation test yields a nonsignificant effect with a 
coefficient c=-.05).  The correlation between the convergence point and the median value of the 
initial opinions is significant (p=.03) but the relatively moderate correlation coefficient c=0.46 
suggests that this relation remains weak. Likewise, the system does not systematically converge 
toward or away from the true value (nonsignificant effect with a coefficient c=.11). Instead, the 
simulations exhibit complex collective dynamics in which the combined effect of various 
elements can drive the group in one direction or another. In agreement with previous works [15], 
the collective outcome appears to be poorly predictable and strongly dependent on the initial 
conditions [36]. Nevertheless, we identified two major attractors of opinions that exert an 
important social influence over the group: 
1. The first attractor is the presence of a critical mass of uncertain individuals who happen to 
share a similar opinion. In fact, when such a cluster of individuals is initially present in 
the system—either by chance or because individuals share a common bias—the rest of the 
crowd tends to converge toward it, as illustrated by Fig. 5-Example2. This majority effect 
is typical of conformity experiments that have been conducted in the past [37], where a 
large number of people sharing the same opinion have a strong social influence on others.  
2. The second attractor is the presence of one or a few highly confident individuals, as 
illustrated by Fig. 5-Example3. The origin of this expert effect is twofold: First, very 
confident individuals exert strong persuasive power, as shown by the influence map. 
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Second, unconfident people tend to increase their own confidence after interacting with a 
very confident person, creating a basin of attraction around that person’s opinion [38,39]. 
 
Our simulations show that the majority effect and the expert effect are not systematically 
beneficial to the group, as both attractors could possibly drive the group away from the truth (Fig. 
5-Example 2). What happens in the case of conflicting interests, when the expert and the majority 
effects apply simultaneously and disagree with each other (Fig. 5-Example 3)? To investigate this 
issue, we conducted another series of simulations in which a cluster of low-confidence 
individuals sharing the same opinion Omaj, is facing a minority of high-confidence experts 
holding another opinion Oexp. As shown by Fig. 6A, the majority effect overcomes the expert 
effect when the proportion of experts pExp is lower than a certain threshold value located around 
10%. However, as pExp increases from 10%, to 20% a transition occurs and the convergence point 
shifts from the majority to the experts’ opinion. Remarkably, this transition point remains stable 
even when a proportion pNeut of neutral individuals (defined as people with random opinions and 
a low confidence level) are present in the system (Fig. 6B). As pNeut increases above 70%, 
however, noise gradually starts to dominate, leading the expert and the majority effects to vanish. 
The tipping point occurring at a proportion of around 15% of experts appears to be a robust 
prediction, not only because it resists to a large amount of system noise (Fig. 6B), but also 
because a previous theoretical study using a completely different approach also reached a similar 
conclusion [40]. 
Discussion  
In this work, we have provided experimental measurements and quantitative descriptions of the 
effects of social influence—a key element in the formation of public opinions. Our approach 
consisted of three steps: using controlled experiments to measure the effects of social influence at 
the scale of the individual, deriving a simple process model of opinion adaptation, and scaling up 
from individual behavior to collective dynamics by means of computer simulations.  
The first result of our experiment is that participants exhibited a significant bias toward their own 
initial opinion rather than equally weighting all social information they were exposed to [6,30]. 
This bias is visible from the influence map shown in Fig. 3, where the blue color corresponding 
to “keep initial opinion” is dominant and the red one corresponding to “adopt the other opinion” 
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is rare. As shown in Fig. 3B, the same trend has been transferred to the model. Moreover, even 
when the “compromise” strategy is chosen, individuals still give a stronger weight ω = 0.4  to 
their own initial opinion, which has also been implemented in the model. Therefore, 
contradictory feedback is typically underestimated—if not completely ignored—but opinions 
corroborating one’s initial opinion trigger an increase in confidence. This observation is 
consistent with the so-called confirmation bias in psychology, namely, the tendency of people to 
pay more attention to information confirming their initial beliefs than information they disagree 
with [41,42]. This result is also in line with early experiments showing that opinions tend to get 
reinforced by group discussions that involve people who initially share a similar judgment [12]. 
Likewise, the fact that individuals holding completely different beliefs exert very little influence 
on each other is consistent with the idea of “bounded confidence”—a modeling concept 
suggesting that social influence is negligible when opinions are initially too distant [20,26]. The 
presence of these elements confirms that our experimental design has indeed captured the 
fundamental mechanisms of social influence, and that factual questions can be used, to some 
extent, to study the fundamental features of opinion dynamics [29]. In the future, an important 
challenge will be to evaluate how the influence map is shaped when emotions and subjective 
beliefs are more relevant (e.g. by using items about political opinions or beliefs that elicit strong 
convictions or emotions). Besides, another important follow-up study that should be conducted in 
the near future is the verification of our assumption that the decision tree observed at the first 
round of interaction remains identical over repeated interactions. 
Scaling up from individual to collective behavior was achieved by means of computer 
simulations in line with existing approaches in the field of self-organization and complex systems 
[2,9,19]. Our simulations allowed us to unravel the precise mechanisms of opinion dynamics in 
large groups of people, which would have been practically impossible to characterize under 
laboratory conditions. In particular, an important ingredient underlying the collective dynamics 
but lacking in previous modeling approaches is the specific interplay between opinion changes 
and confidence changes. First, confidence serves as a sort of system memory. In fact, over 
simulation rounds, individuals are less easily influenced by others because their confidence level 
gradually increases as they receive new feedback. Therefore, simulated individuals do not 
constantly change their opinion but progressively converge toward a stable value in a realistic 
manner. Second, the increase of confidence supports the emergence of basins of attraction during 
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collective opinion dynamics by boosting the attractive power of individuals sharing a similar 
opinion [29]. This process often turns out to be detrimental to the group, because the local 
amount of confidence may grow artificially in a given region of the opinion space, which 
provides false cues to others and triggers a snowball effect that may drive the group in an 
erroneous direction. Interestingly, judgments of high confidence are good indicators of accuracy 
before social influence occurs, but no longer after people have been exposed to the opinion of 
others. It is remarkable that even a mild influence has a significant impact on the reliability of 
high confidence cues, as shown in Fig. 2B. The main problem induced by social influence is that 
people tend to become more confident after noticing that other people have similar opinions. 
Therefore, high confidence is an indicator of accuracy when judgments are independent but 
becomes an indicator of consensus when social influence takes place [43,44]. 
Our simulation results also identified two elements that can cause such amplification loops: the 
expert effect—induced by the presence of a highly confident individual, and the majority effect—
induced by a critical mass of low-confidence individuals sharing similar opinions. Moreover, the 
presence of a significant number of neutral individuals holding a random opinion and a low 
confidence level around these two attractive forces tends to increase the unpredictability of the 
final outcome [15]. Therefore, neutral individuals make the crowd less vulnerable to the influence 
of opinion attractors, and thus less predictable. By contrast, recent studies on animal groups have 
shown that the presence of uninformed individuals in fish schools acts in favor of the numerical 
majority, at the expense of very opinionated individuals [1].  
Our simulations constitute a valuable tool that allows (i) unravelling the underlying mechanisms 
of the system, (ii) forecasting future trends of opinion change, and (iii) driving further 
experimental research and data collection. Nevertheless, it is important to note that the outcome 
of our simulations requires empirical validation in the future. This could be addressed, for 
instance, by means of empirical observations over the Web, where one would measure people’s 
opinion about a social issue over blogs and discussion forums and evaluate how the collective 
opinion changes over time [45,46]. Alternatively, an online experimental approach such as the 
one elaborated by Salganik et al. seems well suited to the study of opinion dynamics under 
controlled conditions [15]. 
By quantifying the balance of power between the expert effect, the majority effect, and neutral 
individuals, our research can inform applications regarding the management of situations in 
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which a small opinionated minority challenges a large population of uninformed individuals. For 
example, the model could help doctors convince a population of laypeople to adopt certain 
disease prevention methods or reversely prevent extremist groups from taking control of a large 
group of people. 
 
Materials and Methods 
Ethics Statement. The present study has been approved by the Ethics Committee of the Max 
Planck Institute for Human Development. All participants gave written and informed consent to 
the experimental procedure. 
Experimental design. The experimental part of the study consisted of two distinct experiments: 
one without social influence (Experiment 1) and one with (Experiment 2). In both experiments, 
participants entered the laboratory individually and were instructed to answer a series of factual 
questions displayed on a computer screen. All participants were naïve to the purpose of our 
experiments and received a flat fee of €8. In Experiment 1, a total of 52 participants (Mage=27 
years, SD=9, 50% females) responded to 32 general knowledge questions, which covered the 
areas sports, nature, geography and society/economy (8 per area; for a complete list of items see 
Table S1). The correct answers to the questions ranged from 100 to 999, which, however, was not 
known to the participants. Participants were instructed to respond as accurately as possible and to 
indicate their confidence on a 6-point Likert scale (1 very unsure to 6 very sure) after having 
given their spontaneous estimate. Questions were displayed one after the other on the computer 
screen, and a new question was given only after participants answered the current one. 
Participants were only informed about the correct answers to the questions after the end of the 
experiment and therefore could not figure out that the true values always lied in the interval [100 
999]. The order of the questions was randomized for each participant. A correlation test of the 
accuracy of answers and the order of the questions yielded non-significant p-values for 90% of 
participants with a probability p>0.05, confirming the absence of any learning process over 
experimental rounds. After the end of the experiments, participants were paid, thanked and 
released. In Experiment 1, participants were not exposed to the social influence of others. The 
1664 data points (corresponding to 52 participants × 32 questions) were used to characterize the 
features of the initial environment, such as the distribution of answers and the analyses of the 
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confidence levels shown in Fig. 1, and as a pool of social influence for the second experiment. 
The same dataset was used to define the initial condition of the simulations presented in Fig. 5. 
In Experiment 2, 59 participants (Mage=33 years, SD=11, 56% females) responded to 15 of the 32 
general knowledge questions used in Experiment 1 and indicated their confidence level. 
Experiment 2 was conducted under the same conditions as in Experiment 1 except that 
participants were informed that they would receive a feedback from another participant. After 
each question, the estimate and confidence level of another randomly selected participant from 
Experiment 1 were displayed on the computer screen, and participants were then asked for a 
revised estimate and corresponding confidence level. This second dataset made of 59×15=885 
binary interactions was used to study the effects of social influence, from which we derived the 
results shown in Figs. 2, 3 and 4. The full list of questions is available in Table S1.  
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: The initial configuration of the system in the absence of social influence. (A) Initial 
distribution of opinions for one representative example question (see Fig. S1 for an overview of 
all 32 items). The normalized answer corresponds to the estimate of the participants divided by 
the true value (i.e., 660°C for this question). The red curve shows the best fit of a lognormal 
distribution. The green dots at the top indicate the location of estimates associated with high 
confidence levels (Ci ≥ 5 ). One of them constitutes an outlier. (B) Accuracy of participants’ 
answers as a function of their confidence level, as determined from the complete dataset (32 
items).  
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Figure 2: Effects of social influence on the wisdom of crowds (A), and the relevance of the 
confidence cue (B). The error is the deviation from the true value as a percentage. (A) Before any 
social influence occurs, the arithmetic (Arith.) mean is sensitive to single extreme opinions and 
does not appear as a relevant aggregating method. The median and geometric (Geo.) mean are 
more robust to outliers. When social influence occurs, however, the distributions are skewed to 
the right and the three indicators are more likely to generate high error values. (B) In the absence 
of social influence (SI), a clear and continuous trend is visible, where individuals with high 
confidence (Ci ≥ 5) constitute a good indicator of the quality of the answer. When social 
influence is injected in the system, however, the distribution becomes noisier and less 
predictable. Overall, social influence generates unpredictability in the observed trends. 
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Figure 3: (A) The influence map extracted from our experimental data and (B) a simplified 
representation of it as implemented in the model. The color coding indicates the heuristic that is 
used by a majority of people, as a function of the difference in confidence ΔCij =Ci −Cj  and the 
distance between the normalized opinions ΔOij = Oj −Oi /Oi . Positive values of ΔCij  indicate 
that the focus subject is more confident than the influencing individual (called feedback), 
whereas negative values indicate that the focus subject is less confident. White zones in (A) 
indicate the absence of sufficient data. Although the majority of people prefer to keep their initial 
opinion when they are more confident than their partner (i.e. the blue strategy dominates for 
ΔCij > 0 ), a zone of strong influence is found at an intermediate distance with ΔCij < 0 . (C) The 
decision tree describing the decision process with three different outcome strategies. The 
individual first looks at the distance between opinions ΔOij , then looks at the difference of 
confidence ΔCij , and finally chooses a strategy accordingly. 
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Figure 4: The probability of increasing (red), decreasing (blue), or maintaining (green) the 
confidence level after social influence. Changes in confidence are indicated according to the 
opinion distance classes as defined in the influence map (Fig. 3): (A) near when ΔOij ≤ 0.3 , (B) 
intermediate when 0.3< ΔOij ≤1.1 , and (C) far when ΔOij >1.1 . A tendency to increase 
confidence is visible in the near and intermediate zones when participants interact with a more 
confident subject. Confidence can also decrease in the far zone, when ΔCij ≥ 4 . 
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Figure 5: Three representative examples of the collective dynamics observed in the computer 
simulations. For each example, the initial opinion map is shown on the left-hand side 
(experimental data), and the final opinion map after N=300 rounds of simulations on the right-
hand side. The opinion maps represent the proportion of individuals with a given opinion (x-axis) 
and a given confidence level (y-axis). As in Fig. 1, the normalized opinion is the actual opinion 
divided by the true value. The correct answer is represented by the red dashed lines 
(corresponding to a value of 1). Outliers with normalized opinion greater than 2 are not shown. 
The arrow maps represent the average movements over both opinion and confidence dimensions 
during simulations. Examples 1, 2, and 3 correspond to the questions “What is the length of the 
river Oder in kilometers? ”, “How many inhabitants has the East Frisian island Wangerooge?”, 
and “How many gold medals were awarded during the Olympics in China in 2008?”, 
respectively. The final convergence point may be determined by a dense cluster of low 
confidence individuals, as illustrated by Example 2 (majority effect), or by a few very confident 
individuals as in Example 3 (expert effect).  
 23 
 
 
Figure 6: Which attractor dominates when the majority effect and the expert effect apply 
simultaneously? (A) The evolution of collective opinion when varying the relative proportion of 
experts pExp, holding an opinion Oexp and a high confidence level Cexp=6, and the proportion of 
people in the majority group pmaj holding an opinion Omaj and a low confidence level randomly 
chosen in the interval Cmaj=[1 3]. Here, the number of neutral individuals is fixed to pNeut=0. (B) 
Phase diagram showing the parameter space where the majority or the expert effects applies, 
when increasing the proportion of neutral individuals pNeut holding a random opinion and a low 
confidence level randomly chosen in the interval Cuni=[1 3]. The schematic regions delimited by 
black or white dashed lines show the zones where the collective opinion converges toward the 
majority or the expert opinion, respectively. In the transition zone, the collective opinion 
converges somewhere between Oexp and Omaj. In some rare cases, the crowd splits into two 
groups or more. 
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Supporting Information Legends 
 
Figure S1: The distribution of answers for all 32 questions used in the first experiment 
(Experiment1, see Materials & Methods). The numbers on the upper right corner correspond to 
the question id, as indicated in the list of questions provided in the table S1. Question id=27 has 
been used for illustrative purpose in the main text (Fig. 1A). The normalized answer is the 
estimate of the participants divided by the true value. The black dashed lines indicate the correct 
answer (normalized value = 1). The red and green dashed lines indicate the mean and the median 
values of the distribution, respectively. The mean values lying farther than 3 are not indicated. 
 
Figure S2: Three representative examples showing the evolution of participants’ confidence over 
simulation rounds. Examples 1, 2 and 3 correspond to those shown in Fig. 4 in the main text. The 
average global confidence is computed by taking the mean value of confidence for all 52 
participants. After a few rounds of simulation, a sharp transition occurs toward high confidence 
levels, attesting for the opinion amplification process.  
 
Table S1: Full list of questions used in the study.  
 
